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In this paper I overview the relation between finance and 
growth of the Korean economy from the year of 1960 to that of 
2004 through the literature survey. Financial regimes of 
liberalization and those of repressions alternated each other 
during this period. However, economic growth continued 
independently of the various financial regimes. Financial 
deepening, as well as an increase in the variety of financial 
instruments, accompanied an increase in per capita income. In 
particular, it is observed that a peak growth rate of the trade 
balance lagged behind eight to ten years that of investments. In 
the interval of these two peaks occurred the financial distresses. 
Possible scenarios for investment financing role of exports are 
suggested.
Keywords: Finance, Growth, Korean economy
JEL Classification: F4, O5
I. Introduction
In 1961, at the start of South Korea’s modern economic 
development, the country had virtually no capital stock. Railroads, 
plants, dams, and factories left by the Japanese had been destroyed 
during the Korean War. The majority of fertilizer plants, electric 
power plants, and mining operations were situated in North Korea, 
reflecting both natural resource distributions and Japanese invest- 
ments. Industry in South Korea, in contrast, was focused on 
agricultural crops and light manufacturing enterprises such as flour 
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mills, breweries, and textile factories. Most of these enterprises, other 
than public electrical and transportation utilities, were later 
auctioned to the public. Per capita income in 1961 was only 
eighty-two U.S. dollars. However, by 1995 it had increased to ten 
thousand and seventy-six U.S. dollars, and South Korea had joined 
the ranks of upper-middle income countries. 
Recent studies of rapid growth performances in East Asia, 
including that of South Korea, indicate that capital accumulation 
was one of the greatest contributing factors to regional growth (Kim 
and Lau 1994; Young 1995). In 1961 per capita capital stock in the 
South Korean economy was two hundred and eighty U.S. dollars, a 
figure that increased to fifty-two thousand and seven hundred U.S. 
dollars by 1995.1 These data suggest that the Korean economy was 
capable of sustaining increased investments throughout the period 
1960-2004. In a developing economy, the initial savings rate is 
usually very low because of low income. How, then, were 
investments financed over such a prolonged period of time? Foreign 
aid or loans are primary sources of investment financing for 
developing economies during their initial development periods. 
However, financing through foreign aid or foreign loans without the 
ability to repay the principal or service debts is ultimately limiting. 
An alternative means of financing is that of exports and of foreign 
direct investments. 
Mountainous South Korea is one of the most densely populated 
areas in the world. Arable land per capita in 1970 was 0.18 acres, 
hindering the export of land-intensive products. Some marine 
products such as agar-agar and seaweed were exported, mainly to 
Japan, in the 1950s. In an economy with few natural resources, how 
did exports become the best alternative for financing industriali- 
zation? Labor, i.e., human capital, was relatively abundant as 
opposed to capital and land in the 1960s. Exports of labor-intensive 
products thus became the natural means of financing industriali- 
zation. As this paper will describe, South Korea’s abundant labor 
compensated for a lack of natural resources and allowed sustained 
industrial financing that, in turn, helped increase labor productivity 
and growth in the economy. In contrast, economies tied to abundant 
1
These figures were computed from Pyo’s (2002) estimate of capital stock. 
Capital stocks comprise residential and non-residential buildings, transport 
and machinery equipment, and other construction equipment.
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natural resources can ultimately become limited by land-intensive 
exports. Investment in human capital through education and 
on-the-job training raises standards of marginal productivity and 
prevents labor scarcity, as measured by labor efficiency units. A lack 
of natural resources, which could have been a major disadvantage to 
this developing economy, became an advantage here in that it led 
South Korea to invest in industrializaion.
As early as 1977 Ranis suggests an export-substitution policy in 
his emphasis on the financial aspects of exports. In a similar vein 
Findlay (1984) notes that the ‘export-led’ growth model helps 
alleviate foreign exchange constraints in a developing economy. An 
outward-looking export-promotion policy has several advantages over 
an inward-looking import-substitution policy. First, exports generally 
remove foreign exchange constraints and facilitate imports of capital 
goods and intermediates. Second, an export economy spurs entrepre- 
neurialism within the domestic economy through competition in the 
international market. In this sense, an export-promotion strategy is 
market conforming in comparison to an import-substitution policy. 
More importantly, export promotion alleviates foreign exchange 
bottlenecks for imports. 
According to Ranis a developing economy passes through two 
stages of development. The first is a primary import-substitution 
stage, based on import-substitution of light consumer goods by 
domestic production. The developing economy then reaches the 
secondary import-substitution stage at which import substitution of 
capital goods and other consumer durable goods is attained. At this 
stage, Ranis further categorized developing economies into two 
groups of ‘deviant’ and ‘non-deviant’. The deviant category would 
make an effort to shift from traditional land-based exports to 
non-traditional labor-based exports. The non-deviant would move 
toward a capital-intensive growth path, pursuing further secondary 
import substitution policies and neglecting productivity in a sector 
with a comparative advantage. Ranis placed Taiwan and Japan in 
the deviant group, while the Philippines and Latin America were 
included in the non-deviant group.
The advanced knowledge and technologies embodied in imported 
capital goods also spillover onto a catch-up economy such as South 
Korea’s, making sustained growth possible. This paper examines the 
growth of the South Korean economy from 1960 to 2004 related to 
its financial aspects with a focus on investment financing role of 
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exports and its impact.
This paper is organized as follows. Each section covers a decade 
starting from the period of nineteen-sixties. Section II describes the 
export promotion policy of 1960s that was associated with the 
five-year economic plans. Section III outlines the heavy chemical 
industrial (HCI) policy of the third five-year economic plan of 1970s 
and reviews industrial coordination policies of 1980s. Section IV 
summarizes the background to the 1997 financial crisis and 
post-crisis financial turbulence. Section V discusses investment 
financing role of exports in relation to Ranis’s export-substitution 
policy. Section VI concludes this paper.
II. Export Promotion Policy of the 1960s
After liberation from Japanese occupation in 1945, the Korean 
government assumed ownership of all Japanese-owned enterprises 
related to the national infrastructure such as railroads and electric 
and telecommunications utilities. Following the military coup of 
1961, the government developed successive five-year plans focused 
on self-sustaining economic development and the expansion of basic 
industries and infrastructure. 
The first and second five-year economic plans of 1962-1971 
focused on establishing enterprises to supply basic industrial 
materials. The state-owned Korea Oil Corporation was established in 
1962 to help meet the demands of transportation and synthetic fiber 
manufacturing. The Korea Oil Corporation later merged into the SK 
Group. Pohang Iron and Steel Company (POSCO), established in 
1968, supplied the other basic material for future industrialization, 
i.e., steel. Agriculture played a key role in the South Korean economy 
at the start of the 1960s, accounting for forty percent of the GDP. To 
meet agricultural demands, the Korea Fertilizer Corporation was 
established in 1967.2  
How were such huge industrial projects financed at the beginning 
of industrialization? Traditional market-based financial organizations, 
including the kye, mujin, and kaekchu, played important roles. The 
most popular of these organizations among the public during the 
1960s was the kye. It pooled resources among members and 
2 The company was founded by Samsung and then donated to the 
government after an incident involving illegal saccharine imports.
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provided loans to members on either a pre-ordered sequence or by a 
lottery. The most influential of these market-based financial 
organizations was the mujin, a type of mutual savings and loan 
institution that was later reorganized into mutual savings and 
finance companies. Lastly, the kaekchu provided short-term financing 
to fishing households (Cole and Park 1983, pp. 120-1). While these 
institutions were too small to finance investments in long-term 
capital equipment, they could finance short-term capital needs. 
Government savings were also insufficient to finance investment 
projects. However, Brown (1973) has suggested that the effective 
management of government enterprises with respect to pricing 
policies contributed to investment financing in that government 
enterprises did not crowd out the private sector. 
Because domestic savings were so low, foreign savings provided a 
major source of investment. From 1962 to 1966, investment funding 
annually averaged fourteen point five percent of the GNP, and sixty 
percent of investments came from foreign funds. The remaining forty 
percent of investment was provided by domestic funds.3 During the 
period of 1960s, twenty-six U.S. billion dollars in foreign capital 
flowed into South Korea, of which approximately ten U.S. billion 
dollars came through official government loans, with the rest through 
commercial loans.4 
The military government that had taken control by coup d’etat in 
1961 promoted an economic developmental regime, in part, to 
solidify its own legitimacy. One of the first acts of the regime was to 
nationalize commercial banks. Currency denominations were also 
altered, and units were changed from hwan to won, with a unit of 
won equaling ten units of the former hwan. This change was 
intended to mobilize domestic savings by forcing citizens to reveal 
any hidden savings. Further, the government issued loans (called 
‘policy loans’) to supplement industrial targets.
During this decade, the nation’s financial infrastructure developed 
in parallel with the establishment of basic industries. Special 
purpose banks such as the Korea Development Bank (KDB, 
established in 1954) provided channels for loans to new corpora- 
tions. Owing to its specialized purpose, the KDB did not accept 
deposits as did normal commercial banks. Other special purpose 
3 
As computed from Table 6 of Brown (1973, p. 58) 
4 
As computed from Table 24 of Brown (1973, p. 215)
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banks such as the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation 
(NACF), Medium Industry Bank (MIB), Central Federation of Fisheries 
Cooperatives (CFFC), and Citizens’ National Bank were also 
established to support farmers, fishing industries, small- and 
medium-sized firms, and housing developers. The Korea Housing 
Bank was established in 1967 to finance housing for low-income 
families. In the same year, the Korea Development Finance 
Corporation (KDFC) was launched to facilitate the creation of private 
enterprises by providing medium- and long-term financing. Another 
special bank, introduced in 1967, was the Korea Exchange Bank 
(KEB), which dealt with foreign exchange. 
The KDB and other special purpose banks provided a major 
proportion of loans in the 1960s. In 1964, the KDB issued 
seventy-three percent of loans in South Korea; commercial banks 
issued the remaining thirty-seven percent. This structure of finance 
indicates that financial market intermediation played no role in the 
1960s. The government retained complete control and extended the 
role of the KDB, allowing it to borrow loans from abroad and to 
guarantee foreign loans provided to domestic firms.
In a developing economy poorly endowed in natural resources, 
exports of manufactured goods are critical sources of funds for 
investment financing. In the latter part of the 1960s, during the 
launch of the second five-year plan, the government placed export 
promotion as its first priority. A package of policy tools including 
preferential taxes and credits, as well as an escalated tariff structure 
for imports and intermediates, was applied to encourage exports. The 
Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA), established in 
1962, was charged with promoting South Korean exports in foreign 
markets.
The foreign exchange rate before 1960 was overvalued in the 
government’s attempt to increase the value of imported goods in 
relation to the domestic currency value of foreign aid counterpart 
accounts.5 In just one year, from 1960 to 1961, the exchange rate 
doubled from sixty-five won to one hundred thirty won per U.S. 
dollar. The rate then remained stable until 1963.
Thus, the Korean financial market in the 1960s can be 
5 
The government’s counterpart fund related to special accounts for foreign 
aid. The over-valued Korean currency before 1960s is one of an interesting 
example, illustrating an under-effected case of transfer payments. 
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characterized as fragmented and unorganized, as is typical of 
underdeveloped financial markets (McKinnon 1973). The role of 
commercial banks as financial intermediaries was absent during this 
period, which was dominated instead by government industrial 
policy. Commercial banks did, however, help to carry out government 
industrial policy. Cole and Park (1983, p. 61) described this financial 
situation as follows: ‘The banks basically issued the guarantees on 
instruction from the government and took little responsibility for 
evaluating either the economic or financial feasibility of the project.’
A. Interest Rate and Foreign Exchange Rate Realization (IRP) of 
1965
The financial reform of 1965 marked a critical development in 
South Korea’s early economic growth period.6 The reform confirmed 
market rates for interest and foreign exchange rates. The interest 
rate for regular commercial bank loans was raised to twenty-six 
percent per annum in 1965 from sixteen percent of the previous 
year. 
This market realization policy successfully restrained inflationary 
pressures and increased domestic savings. The GNP deflator was 
reduced to seven percent in 1965 from thirty-two percent of 1964. 
The gross domestic saving rate with respect to GNP more than 
tripled in the four years following the market realization policy, from 
only four percent in 1964 to as high as sixteen percent in 1968. 
The value of the won plummeted when the won/dollar exchange 
rate increased to two hundred fifty-five won in 1964 from one 
hundred thirty won per U.S. dollar in the previous year. At the same 
time, a decrease in interest rates on export loans encouraged the 
export promotion policy. Interest rates decreased from eight percent 
to six point five percent, and had fallen to six percent by 1967. 
However, the interest rate for general loans increased as a result of 
the IRP policy. From 1961 to 1965, the annual interest rate on 
general loans was eighteen percent and this increased to 
twenty-three percent from 1966 to 1972. Over the same periods, the 
interest rates on export loans fell from nine percent to six percent. 
The IRP made export loans nearly twice as advantageous as general 
loans. This circumstance, together with the devaluation of the won, 
6 
It was recommended by Gurley, Patrick, and Shaw (1965).
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contributed to export promotion. Exports increased and light 
manufactures such as textiles, plywood, and wigs accounted for 
sixty-three percent of the total.
A negative side effect of the liberalization policy was an increase in 
costs for domestic firms. Higher interest rates burdened heavily 
leveraged corporations. Simultaneously, the higher foreign exchange 
rate added additional costs to imported intermediates and capital 
goods. Many domestic firms suffered severe financial distress and 
could not repay loans to commercial banks and private lenders. 
Nevertheless, the IRP policy was significant in that it introduced 
market-oriented financial rules to the economy. 
B. Investments, Financial Distress, and Exports in the 1960s
During the period of 1962-1969 investment increased at an annual 
average growth rate of twenty-seven percent with a peak record of 
fifty-nine point five percent in 1966 following implementation of the 
IRP. Concurrently, the trade balance deteriorated at a nearly similar 
rate of twenty-five percent annually due to the import of most capital 
goods and intermediates. High investment demand together with a 
trade balance deficit exerted financial strain on the domestic 
economy, and the demand for loans exceeded the supply. Additional 
strain was manifested in the curb-market interest rate that exceeded 
the interest rates of time and savings deposits, and reflected market 
imperfections. From 1962 to 1969, the discrepancy between the two 
rate types was twenty-six percent on average (See column 4 on Table 
1). This discrepancy reaches its peak in 1964 over the entire period 
from 1960 to 2004. Interestingly, the annual investment growth 
rates, the rate at which the trade balance deteriorated, and the gap 
between the curb-market and time/savings deposit interest rates 
increased simultaneously at similar rates.
The real GDP grew annually at eight point eight percent during 
this period. At the same time, investments also increased. The IRP of 
1965 increased domestic savings and provided a basis for financing 
investments in exports. In this respect, the primary import 
substitution stage had been achieved. Nonetheless, high interest 
rates imposed debt burdens on corporations. In the third five-year 
plan, government industrial policy was designed to further boost the 
economy by creating a secondary import substitution stage favoring 
heavy and chemical industries.
FINANCE AND GROWTH OF THE KOREAN ECONOMY 385
III. Heavy Chemical Industrial (HCI) Policy of the 1970s
To level the national industrial structure and increase value-added 
earnings, a third five-year economic plan (1972-1976) was set out 
that emphasized heavy chemical industrialization. Following the 
success of the two preceding five-year economic planning policies, 
South Korea’s labor-intensive products had attained a competitive 
edge in international markets. Most intermediates and capital goods 
were imported and were subject to preferential tax treatments, in line 
with the export-promotion policy. From the third five-year economic 
plan on, the government also began to put greater emphasis on 
increasing value-added profits. 
However, during this period, the high interest rate IRP policy was 
still in effect, and a great number of firms were on the verge of 
financial insolvency. The HCI policy faced intense criticism regarding 
over-investment and the generation of excess capacity in the 
economy.
This financial danger was lessened by a special emergency 
measure, decreed on 3 August 1972, that froze private loans 
borrowed from the curb market for three years and gave corporations 
five-year grace periods for loan repayments. One of the purposes of 
the decree was to bring out the private loans of the curb-market to 
the regulatory financial system. By these measures, many corpora- 
tions were able to sustain their production, an operation that might 
not have been possible without the decree. The economy regained its 
vigor, and exports increased to eight point five U.S. billion dollars in 
1975. 
The recycling of oil dollars earned through the export of 
construction materials to, and wage remittances from, Middle 
Eastern countries also favorably assisted the overall balance of 
payments. In 1977, the nation recorded a surplus balance of 
payments, the first since the launch of the five-year economic plans. 
In 1978, domestic savings accounted for twenty-seven point two 
percent of the GNP, far exceeding the three point three percent of 
foreign savings. The strength of domestic savings suggests that the 
Korean economy could ensure its autonomy independently, without 
foreign aid. However, the export structure in 1975 still relied heavily 
on light manufactures such as textiles, even though shares of iron 
and steel, electrical machinery, and transport equipment were rising. 
Textile yarn and fabrics accounted for thirteen percent of total 
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exports, followed by electrical machinery and transport equipment at 
twelve percent.
The development of financial institutions also proceeded in the 
1970s. Non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) such as life insurance 
companies, postal savings programs, trusts, and mutual savings and 
finance corporations (MSFC) were established during this period. 
These new entities brought unregulated financial markets further 
under regulation. Merchant banks also formed in 1976 and played a 
role indiversifying channels of foreign capital.
A variety of financial instruments competed with the curb market 
to provide short-term financing. Commercial Papers (CPs) were first 
established in August 1972. They were issued by non-financial 
corporations, investment and finance companies, and merchant 
banks. Commercial banks issued their own competition to CPs 
through certificates of deposit (CDs). The call money market was 
launched in 1975 to alleviate financial imbalances among commercial 
banks and financial institutions. Repurchase agreements (RPs) also 
came into existence in February 1977 and facilitated short-term 
financing for corporations (Kang 1990). 
However, financial deepening, as measured by the ratio of 
domestic financial assets to the GNP, showed little improvement in 
the 1970s. Furthermore, the gap between the curb-market and the 
time/savings deposit rates had narrowed little by the end of the 
decade. This gap of twenty-seven percent in 1968 had dropped to 
only that of twenty-two percent a decade later (Table 1). These 
figures indicate that the Korean economy in the 1970s remained 
repressed under a dualistic financial system.
There were, however, hopeful signals in the economy. Banking 
activities of 1978 relative to the GDP rose by more than three times 
that of 1965. Another significant character of the financial sector in 
the 1970s was a change in the loan structure in favor of the NBFI. 
The KDB share in the supply of loans and guarantees decreased to 
eighteen percent in 1978, down from thirty-four percent in 1965 
(Cole and Park 1983, p. 63). Meanwhile, the deposit share of the 
NBFIs increased from sixteen percent in 1965 to twenty-eight percent 
in 1977. 
A. Soaring Real Estate Prices and the State-Chaebol Nexus
Several factors can help explain why financial deepening stagnated 
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during the 1970s. A critical factor was soaring inflation, caused by 
the oil-shocks of 1974 and 1979. The real rate of interest, adjusted 
for the consumer price index (CPI), fell from five point three percent 
of the previous year to minus nineteen point three in 1974. This 
inflationary pressure was reinforced by the balance-of-payments 
surplus in 1977, the first since the launch of the five-year economic 
plans. As a result, real estate became a preferred investment. The 
Seoul land value index in the 1970s increased at an annual rate of 
twenty-nine percent which reaches its highest rate of one hundred 
thirty-six percent in 1978, the highest one from 1960 to 2004 (Table 1).
Real estate prices have been blamed for causing growing income 
discrepancies. Wide-spread public criticism made this issue a topic 
of repeated socio-political debate. To avoid undesirable real estate 
speculation, various measures aimed at limiting real estate invest- 
ments were enforced. These measures were less severe for corpora- 
tions than for individuals. For this reason, corporations had far 
greater access to loans than did individuals. Such a situation created 
favorable situations for corporations to invest in physical capital, 
including land. Increased investment by corporations led to increased 
output and resulted in overall economic growth. This growth was a 
positive effect of rising real estate prices, in contrast to the 
undesirable effects of slowed financial market growth and greater 
income discrepancies. 
Real estate is well received by banks as collateral because it 
alleviates problems of moral hazard on the part of borrowers. The 
increase in land prices put corporations that had provided real estate 
as collateral in a favorable position when borrowing from banks. 
Because loans had been allocated by the government since the 
1960s, the large firms that had had greater access to policy loans 
also had more opportunities to obtain real estate. Real estate thus 
provided large firms with a multiplicative way of expanding their 
loans. As a result, many large corporations became highly leveraged, 
a situation that later proved problematic in the 1997 financial crisis.
Real estate also provided another link between the government and 
big corporations in that the government was a major stockholder of 
the commercial banks, and the chaebol were large real estate 
holders. Both the state and the chaebol thus shared a common 
interest in high real estate prices. To the extent that real estate 
prices increased not, primarily, as a result of a bubble but, rather, 
by sustainable fundamentals such as the realization of spillovers 
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from the catch-up economy, the connection formed by real estate 
collateral between the state and big corporations was solid, sound, 
and not vulnerable to external shocks.7 The HCI policy further 
strengthened state-chaebol links. A vast amount of the investment 
required to execute HCI goals was channeled through large 
corporations. The state-chaebol nexus was further solidified, and 
replaced financial instruments of savings and those of investment.
The capital market development law was enacted in 1968, followed 
by an initial public offering law in 1972. Despite preferential 
treatment in terms of corporate taxes, public stock offerings in 
corporations were very limited. As of 1979, only five hundred nine 
corporations were listed on the stock market, and eighty percent of 
those were publicly offered by the designation of the government. The 
potentially lucrative real estate market had created little demand for 
an active stock market. However, stocks boomed in 1977, led by 
stocks in construction corporations. Remittances from Middle East 
construction ignited a rise in stock prices. In early 1977, the Korean 
Stock Price Index (KOSPI) was on the level below one hundred by the 
end of the year, it had risen to one hundred and thirty-seven. 
However, the following year, the stock market was again depressed 
when construction stocks crashed (Rhee et al. 2005, pp. 341-4).
Overall, no significant developments in capital markets occurred in 
the 1970s. Real estate was the favored means of saving and 
substituted for investments in securities. Cole and Park (1983, p. 
109) described the South Korean capital markets in the 1970s as 
follows:
The long-term securities markets are, however, very much a 
product of governmental incentives and direction. While they 
have led to some broadening of the ownership of the major 
corporations, they have not generated significant amounts of 
new capital or reduced the heavy reliance on bank and 
foreign-loan financing, nor have they had much effect in 
reducing the direct links between the government and the 
7
To the extent to which the price of real estate reflects spillover effects 
from imported capital goods and intermediates, the situation suggests that 
real estate values were based on fundamental value and not on a 
speculation-driven bubble. This is true in economic circumstances in which 
interest and wage rates are fixed. In other words, it is considered to be 
plausible that the spillover effects of a catch-up economy fall on the factor of 
land from the viewpoint of functional income distribution. 
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principal owner-managers of the large corporations.
However, even in this financially repressed decade, the South 
Korean economy grew. The emergency presidential decree of 3 
August 1972 spurred economic growth of twelve percent in early 
1973. Growth held at an average of nine percent annually from 1973 
to 1977. This growth performance was comparable to the twelve 
percent growth in 1966, which had followed the interest realization 
policy (IRP) of 1965. Similarly, the next five years after 1965 had 
average annual growth rates of ten percent. Growth performances of 
the latter 1960s and those of the latter 1970s suggest that growth 
was independent of financial liberalization (Cho 1989). 
Notably, in these two periods, investment rates were also high, 
independently of the financial environments. The average annual 
growth rates in investment from 1965-1969 and 1973-1977 were 
thirty-four percent and twenty percent, respectively. Figure 2 shows 
how increases in investments paralleled those of imports. The 
simultaneous rises in these variables were supportive of high growth 
performance. 
B. Industrial Co-Ordination and Trade Structure Improvement in 
the 1980s
At the start of the 1980s, excessive investment as a result of the 
HCI policy, combined with heavy inflation brought on by the 1979 
oil-price shock, burdened the Korean economy. In 1980, the GNP 
deflator increased at a rate of twenty-six percent, and the consumer 
price index soared at an even higher rate of thirty-five percent. The 
political turmoil caused by the assassination of President Park in 
October 1979 increased economic uncertainty. The growth rate in 
1980 plummeted to minus five percent for the first time since the 
launch of the five-year plans this was coupled with massive crop 
failures in the same year. The balance of payments also showed a 
deficit of five point three U.S. billion dollars in 1980, equivalent to 
eight point seven percent of the GNP. In the same year, the average 
debt ratio was on the level of four hundred and eighty-eight (Song 
1997, pp. 76-7).
Neither domestic savings nor trade surpluses could supply the 
capital needed for the HCI policy. After the Park assassination, Doo 
Hwan Chun succeeded to the presidency. The new government’s first 
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goal was to resolve the economic insolvency created by heavy 
indebtedness. Price stabilization was given the highest priority in 
governmental policy, followed by mitigation of excess capital in the 
economy through coordination among chaebols. 
The production capacities of the semiconductor, automotive, steel, 
and shipbuilding industries exceeded relative domestic market 
demand. Such circumstances can create excess competition, and the 
market structure can become monopolistic. The government 
intervened to avoid these effects and attempted to reorganize the 
industrial structure. Hyundai was advised to make automobile 
manufacturing its core industry, while Samsung was told to 
concentrate on semiconductors. Likewise, LG was directed to focus 
on petrochemicals and yield its semiconductor business to Hyundai. 
The electrical generator business was assigned to Daewoo. Such 
reorganization of industries among the chaebols was difficult. To 
implement the plan, the government used cooperation and, 
sometimes, the threat of cutting off loans.
In an effort to stabilize the economy, the government pursued a 
tight fiscal policy aimed at reducing the ratio of the government 
deficit to the GNP. Credit was also restrained to reduce inflationary 
pressure. These price stabilization efforts succeeded, and the 
consumer price inflation rate dropped from an annual rate of 
twenty-five percent during 1980-1981 to seven percent in 1982. 
However, growth rates also fell in 1980 and 1981, reducing the GNP 
growth rate to minus five percent and minus six percent for the 
above years, respectively.
There was a time lag before the economy realized the benefits of 
matured investments related to the Heavy and Chemical Industrial- 
ization Policy of the third five-year economic plan (1972-1976). 
Exports gained momentum in the mid-1980s when low interest rates, 
low oil prices, and low exchange rates of the Japanese yen to the 
U.S. dollar, in accord with the 1985 Plaza Agreement, gave South 
Korea a competitive edge in world markets in heavy and chemical 
manufactures. These favorable factors are often dubbed the 
‘three-lows’ among Korean economists. The rate of return on capital 
reached apeak level in 1988, the same year the Olympics were held 
in Seoul. 
As the balance of payments turned into a surplus, the burden of 
foreign debts incurred at the beginning of the 1980s also declined. 
South Korean exports reached sixty U.S. billion dollars in 1988, and 
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the average debt ratio fell to two hundred and ninety-six in the same 
year (Song 1997, pp. 76-7). The 1980s thus became an era in which 
South Korea’s export structure began to level and the nation’s 
comparative advantage shifted from labor-intensive manufactures to 
heavy-chemical industrial products. More than half of the total 
commodity exports were HCI goods (Hong 2002, pp. 146-7). These 
indicators are best exemplified by the rate of increase in the trade 
balance in 1986. It improved by seven hundred thirty-three percent. 
This successful performance of the Korean economy indicates that 
she passes through Ranis’s secondary import-substitution stage and 
the state-chaebol ties were tight and firm as explained by Amsden 
(Amsden 1989, p. 63).8 
C. Financial Reform of the 1980s and Erosion of the State- 
Chaebol Nexus
Tight monetary and fiscal policies in 1980 and 1981 kept 
inflationary pressures under control. The real rate of interest in 1982 
was positive for the first time since the 1965 interest rate realization 
policy. The economic environment of the 1980s provided a favorable 
situation for undertaking financial reforms. The real rate of interest 
in 1982 returned to a positive rate of nine percent after having 
suffered negative rates in the latter 1970s. By 1984, the real interest 
rate had reached twelve percent. Between 1981 and 1983, the 
8 
There certainly is an ambiguity between an export-substitution and the 
import-substitution policy on the second stage as it is read in the following 
passage of Ranis (1977, pp. 42-3):
We, of course, recognize that these “choices” of growth paths, and of 
accompanying policy packages, are never quite as clear-cut as all 
this in real life, but tend to fade into each other at the edges. But 
while there certainly exist substantial elements of both secondary 
import substitution and export substitution in the overall production 
and trade structure of most LDC’s, the contrasts painted here are 
both meaningful and instructive.
The above passage suggests that the export substitution policy, not 
neglecting its financial aspects through exports, needs to be distinguished 
from the import substitution policy in which the comparative advantage is 
not well taken into account. The relevance of the heavy chemical industrial 
policy in this context could be explained in its exerting disciplinary efforts for 
development of comparative advantages in relation to her possible exports for 
the future. 
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government divested its equity shares in all nationwide city banks, 
transferring ownership to private banks. Many administrative 
controls on banking were also eliminated, and entry barriers to 
financial markets were reduced. Moreover, preferential interest rates 
applied to policy loans were abolished (Nam 1994, p. 89).
Significantly, in early 1984 financial intermediaries were permitted 
to determine their own rates within a given range (Nam 1994, p. 
191). Diversified financial services were also provided. Unlawful 
financial practices through the unorganized market provoked 
financial reform focused on the development of non-bank financial 
institutions (NBFI) as a substitute for the informal sector. The NBFIs 
were largely owned by the chaebol whose shares in commercial 
banks sharply increased throughout the 1980s. 
The ratio of domestic financial assets to the GNP nearly doubled in 
the 1980s, increasing from two point four in 1980 to four point two 
in 1990. A salient feature during this period was the increase in the 
share held by the NBFIs. The ratio of non-bank deposits to the GDP 
increased to sixty percent in 1990, from thirty-eight percent in 1980. 
Financing through corporate bonds also grew from four point five 
percent in 1980 to ten point two percent in 1987. However, the most 
notable change in this period was the significant increase in the 
stock market share of the GDP. It increased to eleven percent in 
1988, from six percent in 1987. 
Financial reforms of the 1980s liberalized the financial market to a 
great extent. The government moved to privatize the banks and even 
deregulate interest rates within given ranges. The NBFI absorbed 
non-regulated financial markets, lessening the dualistic financial 
market structure. The curb-market interest rate exceeded the market 
rate by only two point four percent in 1987, down from a seventeen 
percent difference in 1977 (Table 1). Another indicator of the success 
of the financial reforms was the liquidity supply of the economy 
increased as measured by the ratio of M3 to GDP. By this indicator 
it had risen to point eighty-eight in 1988 from point thirty-seven in 
1976 (Table 1). 
However, the economy had not liberalized to the extent necessary 
for the financial market to perform intermediary functions in place of 
the government. The government assigned bonds to the NBFI. 
Investment trust companies established the Bond Management Fund 
(BMF) in which individuals could invest by purchasing certificates 
and participate indirectly in the bond markets. As of 1989, seventeen 
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trillion won worth of outstanding Monetary Stabilization Bonds were 
held by the NBFI (Kang 1990, pp. 70-1). The amount of commercial 
bank shares that could be held by an individual was limited to eight 
percent of the bank’s total equity stock. In addition, the government 
continued to appoint top bank management throughout the 1980s. 
These restrictions discouraged active equity investments by large 
corporations in these banks. Although the financial markets were not 
fully liberalized, the influence of the chaebols on the financial 
markets increased through their ownership of NBFI. Kim (1997, p. 
189) and other observers wondered, therefore, whether the state- 
chaebol nexus could be sustained:
The chaebol’s investment in financial services also high- 
lights a direct competition occurring between the state and 
the chaebol for the provision of such services. Although 
direct competition in banking is avoided due to the state’s 
prohibition of chaebol ownership of banks, it still leads us 
to a basic question of whether a comprehensive develop- 
mental state is necessary when the private sector is mature 
enough to provide certain services such as banking
The chaebols’ influence also increased substantially in the 1980s 
in the real sector. In 1985 the value-added products of the five 
largest chaebols accounted for more than six percent of GNP; for the 
top thirty chaebols, this proportion rose to twelve percent (Chang 
2003, p. 10). Thus, the 1980s were an era in which the chaebols 
expanded their influence both in the real and financial sectors of the 
Korean economy. The chaebols were instrumental in driving 
economic growth, exploring economies of scale, and also realizing 
economies of scope. 
IV. Financial Liberalization and the 1997 Financial Crisis
A democratization of politics accompanied the favorable economic 
changes of the 1980s. President Tae-woo Roh began his administra- 
tion with a promise of greater democratization on 29 June 1987, and 
created an economic environment favorable to economic liberaliza- 
tion. A distinguishing feature of the economy during this period was 
a drastic increase in the wage rate beginning the mid-1980s. The 
nominal wage rate of 1985 had increased four-fold by 1994.9 Profit 
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margins from investment were squeezed out by the higher wage rate, 
and the rate of return on capital began to fall. The strengthening of 
labor unions under President Young-sam Kim’s democratization 
regime (1993-1998) further strengthened wages. 
Economic deregulation paralleled political democratization and was 
further intensified by Korea’s entry into the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1996. The 
remarkable performance of the Korean economy in terms of GDP, 
trade volume, and per capita income had made the nation eligible for 
OECD membership. The opening of financial markets was a natural 
outcome of OECD membership and general trends in Korea’s political 
climate. 
However, despite growing liberalization, the government-chaebol 
nexus remained firm, guided by the government’s implicit guarantee 
of chaebol loans, and the government’s continuing direct or indirect 
appointment of bank management personnel. The chaebol- 
government relationship created negative side effects despite the 
spectacular growth performances of the Korean economy. Two 
problems in particular stood out. First, large corporations were 
highly leveraged, as noted above. In 1997 the top-thirty chaebols had 
average debt-equity ratios of six hundred (Chang 2003, pp. 12-3). 
The second problem related to lack of discipline in the financial 
sector. Loan decisions were based on government industrial policy, 
which guided fund allocations, rather than by nonbiased surveillance 
and evaluation of risks. 
The scarcity of loans meant that it was common practice for 
short-term loans to be rolled over without further restraints. Without 
full economic reform in lending practices, the financial sector and 
the implicit state-chaebol nexus were left to market discipline by the 
financial liberalization policy of 1995, summarized by Woo-Cumings 
(2001, p. 362) as follows:
The dilemma in Korea is that the state had to both 
guarantee and discipline the chaebol. The true “miracle” in 
Korea in the three decades since the 1960s was that it 
juggled these conflicting roles. But in the early 1990s the 
government abandoned its juggling act, without putting in 
place prudential regulations to rein in the behavior of the 
9 
As computed from Table 5.7 of Song (1997, p. 76). 
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nonbank financial intermediaries, which were increasingly 
providing an internal capital market for the chaebol. This 
auto-da-fe in favor of the “markets” left Korea defenseless in 
the face of a massive financial crisis.
The chaebol had grown to the extent that the government could no 
longer play the role of implicit guarantor or justify the “too big to 
fail” slogan. Instead, the chaebol had become “too big to bailout” for 
the state. The state-chaebol nexus, which had helped build the 
Korean economic success, had become a source of economic fragility 
and was vulnerable to external shocks. This vulnerability, which had 
to be dealt with within the fiscal discipline of financial liberalization, 
contributed to the 1997 financial crisis. 
A. A Triple Mismatch and Future Prospects 
Prior to the 1997 financial crisis, the difference between market 
and curb rates of interest remained relatively stable. The share of 
loans provided by the NBFIs also changed little. However, one 
important shift was the liberalization of the capital account. As noted 
above, Korea joined the OECD in 1996. Although the capital account 
was liberalized, large corporations remained highly leveraged, 
suggesting that the state-chaebol inertia remained intact. 
Korea’s domestic financial sector was unprepared for the altered 
economic environment in the wake of the 1995 financial liberali- 
zations. The rollover of short-term loans, creating de facto long-term 
loans, was still common practice. Financial audits were mere 
formalities for meeting tax office report requirements. Cross-share 
holdings of equities and cross-loan guarantees among affiliates and 
between subsidiaries and the home company of the chaebols were 
also prevalent. Merchant banks expanded with democratization in 
politics. These banks were mostly owned by the chaebol and 
funneled necessary funds to the large corporations. Furthermore, 
most merchant bank loans were made to firms within the chaebol 
group. These institutions served as financial intermediaries to fill the 
gap between the banks and the stock market. Merchant banks even 
used portions of funds borrowed at low rates from the international 
financial market to invest in high-yield foreign junk bonds. 
In 1997 the top five chaebol owned three merchant banks, six 
securities companies, three investment trust companies, three life 
insurance companies, and twelve other financial services (Chang 
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2003, p. 58). Profligate management of the merchant banks has been 
noted as a cause of the financial crisis. Not possessing their own 
credit and risk assessment capabilities, the domestic financial 
institutions were exposed to risk from the large corporations of the 
chaebol. 
The debt-GDP ratio of the South Korean economy had continued 
to decrease since its peak in the early 1980s. The nation had ample 
capability to repay debts and interest, and the debt service-export 
ratio was below ten percent. The ratio of short-term debt to total 
external debt, however, reached fifty percent in 1997, provoking a 
liquidity crisis on the withdrawal of foreign short-term debts. 
As noted above, the chaebol had grown excessively large in 
relation to the Korean economy in the 1990s. They had begun to 
outweigh the government in their size and in their role following the 
HCI policy of the third five-year economic plan. A large inflow of 
foreign capital further diminished the previous role of the 
government as a guarantor of foreign loans, a situation exemplified 
by the government’s inability to bail out Hanbo, which was then one 
of the largest corporations of the top-thirty chaebols in Korea. 
Thereafter, Sammi, Jinro, and Kia were subject to court surveillance. 
These failures showed that the government could no longer serve as 
implicit guarantor of foreign loans. Foreign investors lost confidence 
in the ability of the Korean economy to protect loans and many 
loans were withdrawn. 
Under such an environment, capital liberalization endangered the 
capability to repay external loans. Banks were defenseless when 
requested to repay short-term debt, as opposed to the conventional 
loan rollover practices. As foreign creditors called in loans and pulled 
out of the Korean stock market, the domestic exchange rate received 
a boost from the drastic increase in the exchange rate. 
Foreign loans denominated in U.S. dollars were extended to 
long-term loans in domestic currency (won). The assets and net 
worth of banks fell greatly because of the depreciated won. This 
deterioration of bank balance sheets led to further outflow of foreign 
capital and additional weakening of the won, creating a downward 
spiral of devaluation.
The state-chaebol nexus, which had taken the place of the 
savings-investment financial market, could no longer be sustained 
within financial liberalization. Chang (2003) noted that ineffective 
restructuring of economic practices based on the traditional ties 
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between the state and chaebols was a result of this underlying 
inertia. Thus, a mismatch arose between the state and the chaebols 
regarding the state’s implicit guarantee of chaebol loans. Chang 
(2003, pp. 35-7) argued the following:
The Korean financial crisis made it manifest that both 
chaebols and the government failed to respond to their 
changing constraints. The transition of chaebols and the 
government did not entail the scrapping of the old system 
and starting from scratch. Rather, the routines and 
practices, organizational forms, and social ties persisted and 
functioned as sources of inertia … Thus, the crisis of 1997 
was due to this mismatch between changing the external 
environments and internal capabilities of both chaebols and 
the government. This mismatch was caused by inertia of 
both institutions. 
In summary, a triple mismatch caused the financial crisis of 1997: 
mismatches of currency, loan maturity, and the state-chaebol ability 
to cope with the capital account liberalization.
How could future financial markets prevent the occurrence of this 
interrelated triple mismatch? If the government had avoided implicit 
guarantees on loans for big corporations in advance of the capital 
account liberalization, over-borrowing from abroad would not have 
occurred. Likewise, the crisis could have been avoided if the 
long-term capital markets had been sufficiently developed to absorb 
the rollover of short-term loans denominated in U.S. dollars. 
Eichengreen and Hausman (1999) referred to loan maturity and 
currency mismatch as the ‘original sin’, indicative of imperfect capital 
markets in a developing economy. This ‘original sin’ model also 
involves the interrelated foreign exchange and long-term bond 
markets. Stability of the long-term bond market would deter foreign 
investors from withdrawing capital out of the host country similarly, 
long-term confidence in domestic currency would induce foreign 
investment into the long-term capital market. It is debatable as to 
which market is more relevant when it comes to ensuring stability in 
other markets. For instance, McKinnon (2002, p. 235) has argued 
that East Asian economies need stable exchange rates with respect 
to the dollar to create economic environments conducive to 
developing long-term bond markets:
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Only with long-term confidence in the purchasing power of 
domestic money (against the center country’s) would 
exchange rate expectation be naturally regressive and 
long-term bond and mortgage markets be possible to 
organize ― both domestically and for commercial (non- 
sovereign) international borrowing.
If a long-term expectation with respect to reversing the flow of 
foreign short-term withdrawals had been developed, much of the 
adjustment costs of the crisis could have been alleviated. After the 
crisis, South Korea’s financial markets experienced substantial 
changes in the bond market, followed by a general restructuring of 
the financial sector.10 
B. Aftermath of the Crisis
Foreign capital returned to Korea after successful recovery from 
the financial crisis. This return made it easier for the general public 
to obtain loans from financial institutions. Easy access, which had 
previously been limited to large corporations or privileged chaebols, 
was now extended to the general public. One notable outcome was 
an increase in household debt. Loans to households accounted for 
twenty percent of total loans in 1993 and fifty percent of total loans 
in 2004. The indiscriminate issue of credit cards to the general 
public also directly increased household debt. The so-called credit- 
card problem led to a rise in household defaults. However, greater 
access to credit also generated increased domestic demand, offsetting 
the recessionary economic downturns related to the financial crisis. 
A loan repay program in parallel with that offered to corporations 
was developed for households in danger of credit default.
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, public investments in 
social overhead capital for schools, public libraries, and highway 
construction gradually became more market based. One example was 
the enterprise-city development plan. According to this plan, a large 
corporation could be given land expropriation rights. Capital gains 
accruing from the land development would then be used for local 
public interests. This new plan transferred the traditional state right 
to use and purchase land to large corporations, mostly chaebols. 
10 IMF program and the changes in the financial market after the crisis are 
relegated to the Appendix. 
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This move indicates that the chaebols had gained an even more 
influential position relative to the state in that they had become 
involved in regional developmental projects, projects that had been 
the sole responsibility of the government in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Investments in social overheads have frequently been carried out 
by consortiums. The structures and facilities built by the consortium 
may then be transferred to government, and the costs incurred 
would be covered either by usage fees or by renting to the 
government for a certain period. In the former case, the private 
sector shares in the risk, while in the latter case, the government 
assumes most risk. This type of investment involves more 
market-based decision-making with respect to sharing risks the than 
did investments carried out by the government in the 1970s and 
1980s. The success of the enterprise-city proposal depends on the 
extent to which real estate prices stabilize and balanced development 
across regions can be achieved. 
The rest of this paper reviews the investment financing role of 
exports in the growth experience of the Korean economy within this 
developmental period in light of the Ranis’s export-substitution 
strategy.
V. Investment Financing Role of Exports
Figure 1 exhibits the rate of change in fixed capital stock and that 
in trade balance from the period of 1960 to that of 2004. The fixed 
capital stock reached its highest rate of increase by fifty-nine point 
five percent in 1966 following the financial liberalization regime of 
the interest rate realization policy (IRP). Another peak growth rate of 
the capital stock is marked by the rate of thirty-four point four 
percent in 1978, largely due to the heavy chemical industrial (HCI) 
policy. A decade of 1990s began with its peak rate of investment by 
twenty-five point four percent. These peak rates of investment are 
shown in Figure 1 together with those of the trade balance 
improvement rates.
The rate of change of trade balance on Table 1 is defined as the 
change of the trade balance relative to that of income. The 
counterpart peak rate of the improvement of the trade balance is 
lagged behind that of the investment rate by about eight to ten 
years. The rate at which the trade balance improves most rapid 
during 1970s is recorded by seventy-six point five percent of 1976. 
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FIGURE 1
THE RATE OF CHANGE IN FIXED CAPITAL STOCK AND THE RATE OF CHANGE 
IN TRADE BALANCE FROM 1960 TO 2004
This rate increased by about a seven and the half times that of 
1986. The most remarkable improvement rate is marked in 1998 by 
twenty-two and the half times of the previous financial crisis year of 
1997. The increase of trade surplus with respect to income lessens 
the financial strains of the economy.
Figure 1 presents events of financial repressions and those of 
liberalizations in a chronological order during the period from 1960 
to 2004 of the Korean economy. It starts from the beginning of 
1960s with the financial repression of the currency denomination 
from hwan to won. These events are shown to occur in the 
intermediate period between the peak of the investment rate and that 
of the trade balance improvement rate. The August 3
rd Decree of 
1972 was promulgated in between the trade balance peak of 1976 
and the investment peak of 1966. A trade balance was deteriorated 
by the rate of three point nine percent in the preceding year of the 
Decree (See Table 1). A foreign debt problem of 1980 occurred in 
between the trade peak of 1986 and the investment peak of 1978. 
Trade deficit occurred in concurrent with the foreign debt. The 
financial crisis of 1997 in its time scale is situated in between the 
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trade balance peak of 1998 and the investment peak of 1990. The 
trade deficit in the crisis year of 1997 increased by the two times 
that of the previous year. 
This recurrent pattern of financial distresses associated with 
investment and the resolutions by the improvement of trade balances 
at an approximately decade intervals is consistent with the deviant 
pattern of developing economies as proposed by Ranis as for the 
investment financing role of exports.
A. A Comparison of Two Peak Rates
In the previous section the two peak rates are compared for 
explanation of the Ranis’s export earning hypothesis for resolution of 
the financial strains of a developing country. What justification do 
we have for this explanation? Two scenarios may be suggested with 
respect to the direction of its causality. One possible hypothesis is 
that the investment precedes the financial resolutions achieved by 
the trade surplus. The alternative one is on the view point of the 
reverse direction. Export earnings provide opportunities for invest- 
ment expansion which is associated with imports of intermediate and 
capital goods. The financial distresses related to trade deficits 
eventually limit the investment.11 
In the first scenario a ‘time to build’ model related to trade 
structure of an economy is implicit in comparing the two peaks. It 
takes time in construction of buildings and equipments for 
production of exportables. 
This argument is based on the presumption that most of capital 
equipments and intermediates necessary for production in a 
developing economy are imported. Figure 2 displays the relationship 
between these two variables. The investment ratio of GDP moves in 
parallel with that of the import ratio throughout the period of four 
decades except for the period beginning from 1990s up to the 
financial crisis period.12 It suggests that financial returns on 
11 
This second possibility is suggested by one of the referees. 
12 
One of the possible explanations for this divergence could be due to a 
change in trade structure of the economy. Capital goods and equipments are 
no longer imported and they are substituted by domestic production. The 
other alternative explanation is due to the lagged-effects of investments are 
prolonged. What is significant, however, in the argument of this paper is in 
an exhibition of the co-movement of the investments and the imports by the 
end of 1980s. 
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investment are realized by trade surplus. The time intervals of 
investments-returns are measured by those of the two peaks. This 
consideration leads us to a presumption that a firm’s financial 
burdens become most severe in the middle of the two peaks before it 
reaps its export earnings. 
One of the most convenient measures for distinguishing between 
these two scenarios in the present paper is the ratio obtained by 
division of the previous peak growth rate of investment by the lagged 
one of trade balance improvement. It is interpreted as the amount of 
the rate of investment for a given rate of improvement of trade 
balance to be able to finance and is considered to represent the 
degree of the effectiveness of Ranis’s investment financing role of 
exports. A decrease of this ratio implies that the financing role of 
exports gradually decreases. As a trade structure of an economy 
undergoes a change by replacement of imported capital goods with 
domestic production or as the liquidity supply is sufficient by the 
financial deepening of the domestic economy this measure of the 
effectiveness of the investment financing role of export will be 
decreased. 
Over the four decades decreased the peak growth rates of the 
increase in the fixed-capital stock as against the increase of that of 
the improvement in trade balance. This effectiveness ratio of 
investment financing of exports decreases to five percent in 1986 and 
finally one percent in 1998 from eighty percent in 1976. This 
investment-related import demand scenario is considered to be more 
appropriate for the periods up to the end of nineteen eighties.
As the liquidity constraints for firms are alleviated along with the 
increase in the supply of liquidity in the economy the financial role 
of the trade surplus will be diminished. It is noted in the last 
column of Table 1 the liquidity of the economy as measured by the 
ratio of M3/GDP exceeds one from the beginning period of 1990s. 
This period of increasing liquidity supply coincides with each other 
that of the Korean economy passing through Ranis’s secondary stage 
of import substitution.       
B. A Virtuous Circle of Spillover Effects 
In explaining the growth of a catch-up, late-industrializing 
economy such as that of South Korea, Amsden (1989) attributed 
successful growth performance to the state, entrepreneurs, a highly 
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qualified workforce, and well-trained bureaucrats and firm managers. 
These factors contribute to the transfer of technology and applications 
from contact with foreign marketing personnel, engineers, and 
scientists, and help the market open. Acquisition of knowledge and 
know-hows through spillover effects from imported capital goods and 
intermediates could be another factor which contributes for transfer 
of technology. 
Financing of the investment-related imports by export earnings 
creates a virtuous circle through which knowledge spillover effects 
occur to the domestic economy. This process of the investment- 
related imports turns out to be favorable for economic growth of the 
Korean economy. 
The next to the last column of Table 1 presents the rate of change 
in Seoul land value index. This index shows that the Seoul land 
price was more than doubled in 1977. One of the most influential 
factors for this hiking price level is the balance of payments surplus 
due to the recycling of the then oil dollar brought by the 
construction workers at the Middle East. Besides this surplus from 
the service account the trade surplus of the previous year is another 
factor to be taken into account. Subsequent to the trade surplus of 
1986 was the rate of the increase of the land value index by 
thirty-three point five percent observed in 1989. In an economy in 
which financial market is not yet fully developed the land price index 
can be considered as a measure of capital gains for investments. 
These accruals of capital gains of investments reinforce the virtuous 
investment cycle.
A different interpretation for the circle becomes possible, 
depending on which peak rate one first starts from. Suppose one 
starts from that of the trade balance. Expansion of overinvestment 
becomes possible on this trade balance peak because of the 
expectation of the accruals of future capital gains. This over 
investment results in a trade deficit and the financial distress 
occurs. After a lapse of a certain period of time, trade surplus picks 
it up by exchange rate adjustments. Then the favorable expectation 
repeats itself generating the investment-related import demand. This 
scenario is reverse to the first one in a direction of its causality. This 
export-expansion scenario of the trade peak preceding to the 
investment peak much hinges on price flexibility of the economy. 
Indeed, the fortunate events of the three lows in the middle of 
nineteen-eighties and the plummeted value of won in nineteen ninety 
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eight all attributed for the trade surpluses. This would not, however, 
have become possible without the productive capacity of the economy 
to meet the foreign demands. In this respect the export-expansion 
scenario is more relevant for the economy in which productive 
capacity to meet export demands already exist. Access to liquidity 
becomes presumably easier in this economy and the role of exports 
for investment financing is negligible.  
However, for the economy in which no sufficient capital 
equipments are provided and starts from the scratch as it was in the 
early developmental periods of nineteen sixties and nineteen 
seventies of the Korean economy the investment-related import 
demand scenario is considered to be more relevant.    
Spillover effects from imported capital goods increase productivity 
of domestic labor and provide a competitive edge for technologically 
more sophisticated industries. This continuous injection of spillover 
effects from the advanced economy makes it possible for an economy 
to move its trade structure toward more sophisticated ones. Without 
import of capital goods being able to be financed by exports, 
economic growth of the early developmental stage could not have 
been sustained.
The functional distribution of income related to spillover effects is 
another important issue for the economy on her early developmental 
stage. In an economy in which financial market is depressed and the 
labor market is also suppressed, spillover effects from the abroad 
would most likely to fall onto the real estate sector as well as on the 
capital goods. In Korea, land is scarce in its supply relative to labor 
and its soaring prices as indicated previously are supportive of this 
conjecture. 
Real estates were, therefore, well received as collateral with which 
to secure loans from financial institutions. Real estate collateral 
provided by the chaebols to financial institutions helped sustain the 
state-chaebol nexus until at least the mid-1980s. The exhaustion of 
spillover effects meant the end of capital gains appropriations. The 
state-chaebol nexus erodes itself as the capital gains from real 
estates could no longer be accrued. The eventual bursting of the real 
estate bubble suggests that a developing economy must pass 
through Amsden’s learning stages (Amsden 1989), before entering the 
mature stage. 
The recurrent circles of investment, financial distress, and exports 
followed by soaring real estate prices were conducive to economic 
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growth as long as the positive externalities were involved in the 
investment. On entering the mature economic stage, once the 
realization of externalities associated with investments and capital 
gains were no longer possible, the bubble on which the real estate 
prices were founded was bound to burst. This occurrence, however, 
provided a favorable economic environment for financial market 
deepening, as indicated by the increase in the ratio of domestic 
financial assets to the GDP. Autonomy of financial intermediation in 
asset portfolio management as well as in loans could also improve.
The macroeconomic and financial indicators shown in Table 1 
confirm the conventional wisdom that financial deepening occurs 
with rises in per capita income (Gurely and Shaw 1955, 1967; 
Goldsmith 1969). The portion of liquid liabilities relative to the GDP, 
as measured by the M3/GDP ratio, increased from point thirty-seven 
in 1971 to one point sixty-five in 2004. The gap between the 
curb-market interest rate and the time/savings deposits interest 
rates was substantially reduced. In 1963 the curb-market rate 
exceeded the time and savings deposit rates by thirty-one percent. 
This gap almost disappeared in 2004, suggesting that the financial 
market became integrated and absorbed fragmented informal 
financial markets after a certain developmental stage. Sustained 
economic growth throughout four decades of alternating financial 
regimes also suggests that the type of financial regime had no direct 
effect on economic growth. However, subdividing the four decades 
allows examination of any systemic recurrent patterns with respect 
to investment, financial distress, and trade balances.
Increases in investment throughout the period from 1960 to 2004 
have sustained growth of the Korean economy. Starting from the 
market-oriented financial regime of 1965, financial repression and 
liberalization alternated, ending with financial liberalization after the 
financial crisis. Amidst these alternating regimes, financial 
liberalization and investment increased without any significant 
interruptions, and economic growth continued, leading the economy 
to a mature stage of financial diversification. The pattern of 
investments, imports, financial distress, exports, and soaring real 
estate prices repeated itself before the spillover effects of the catch- 
up economy were exhausted and before it reaches her maturity. 
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FIGURE 2
INVESTMENTS AND IMPORTS AS PERCENT OF GDP FROM 1960 TO 2004
VI. Conclusion
A Rostowian take-off of the Korean economy was possible through 
risk taking by the authoritarian state led by President Chung-hee 
Park, in collaboration with the early chaebol founders. Joint risk 
taking by the state and business connected to the credit supply, 
which was controlled by the government. 
From 1960 to 2004, an alternate sequence of financial repression 
and financial liberalization occurred at approximately decadal 
intervals. South Korea’s financial market was repressed at the 
beginning of 1961 with a currency denomination but turned in a 
more market-oriented direction with the introduction of the interest 
rate realization policy (IRP) in 1965. High interest rates due to 
market liberalization, together with the heavy and chemical 
industrial (HCI) policy of the third five-year economic plan (1972- 
1976), put financial burdens on corporations and prompted the 
emergency presidential decree of 3 August 1972. In this period, the 
financial market returned to repression. 
However, the economy grew throughout these two financial 
regimes, without interruptions. The economy grew at ten percent 
from 1961 until the implantation of the IRP policy. Likewise, the 
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economy grew at nine percent on average for five subsequent years 
following the August 1972 emergency decree. The annual rate of 
investment was high in both of these periods: thirty-four percent 
from 1965 to 1969, and twenty percent from 1973 to 1977. 
Commercial banks allocated loans under the state-chaebol nexus, 
regardless of the financial regime in the 1960s and 1970s. This loan 
allocation scheme was effective in mobilizing domestic savings and 
implementing industrial policy. Significant to the IRP, however, was 
that a market-oriented financial regime was introduced at the initial 
period of the development stage and helped spur growth momentum 
for the Korean economy.
Until the 1997 financial crisis, substantial improvements, such as 
financial deepening and an increase in the variety of financial 
instruments, occurred throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Unregulated 
financial markets were absorbed into regulated ones with develop- 
ment of the NBFI. The gap between curb-market and time deposit 
interest rates was reduced from twenty percent in 1979 to twelve 
percent in 1989. The financial deepening ratio in1989, measured by 
the ratio of liquid liabilities to the GDP, was nearly two times that in 
1979.
With the success of the HCI policy, the influence of large 
corporations on the economy increased with respect to output, 
employment, and loan sizes. Increasing ownership of the NBFIs and 
commercial banks by the chaebols allowed the chaebols to compete 
with the government in the financial market. The state-chaebol 
nexus thus became increasingly eroded, beginning in the mid-1980s. 
Labor unions became more active in conjunction with political 
democratization, and wage rates soared from the mid-1980s. Profits 
from investment were squeezed out, and the rate of return on capital 
began to decline. South Korea also became a member of the OECD 
in 1996, a move that obliged the government to open the capital 
account. This greater openness was another significant change in the 
economic environment and influenced the state-chaebol relationship.
The financial crisis of 1997 showed that the government could no 
longer play the role of guarantor for large corporations. The state- 
chaebol bond came to its demise, and IMF financial remediation was 
instituted. The growth and finance pattern of the last four decades 
suggests that the relationship between the state and business in 
South Korea has changed as the economy has moved through 
several developmental stages.  
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Over these four decades, a systematic pattern of growth in relation 
to finance has occurred. Financial distress caused by investment has 
been relieved through increased exports. This investment-cum-export 
cycle has been repeated at approximately ten-year intervals. After the 
financial distress of the early 1970s, export performance greatly 
improved, laying the foundation for the export of light manufactured 
goods, passing through Ranis’s first import-substitution stage. 
Likewise, after overcoming the financial burdens of the early 1980s 
created by the recall of foreign loans through the ‘three lows’, the 
Korean export structure was leveled up to heavy chemical manu- 
factures such as electrical appliances, ships, steel, semiconductors, 
and automobiles. By this time it reaches Ranis’s second stage of 
import-substitution. The financial crisis of 1997 was also followed by 
a recovery marked by an increase in exports of semiconductors, 
automobiles, information technology equipment, and steel. 
Each financial recovery was associated with an increase in exports. 
Export-led growth of the South Korean economy has relieved harsh 
financial distress over the past four decades. In this respect, South 
Korea’s economic growth and associated financing from 1960-2004 
has exhibited a pattern consistent with Ranis’s export-substitution 
strategy. Financial deepening has occurred, and financial services 
have diversified, confirming Gurley and Shaw’s hypothesis (1955, 
1967).
Following the financial crisis, the government has moved from a 
partnership role to one involved in creating an economic environment 
favorable for market discipline in the financial and real sectors. 
Economic restructuring after the financial crisis has been carried out 
in this context. The Financial Supervisory Commission supervises 
and coordinates bank mergers and acquisitions. The Fair Trade 
Commission aims to improve corporate governance and the business 
transparency of the chaebols. Restructuring problems and the 
promotion of market discipline have replaced the five-year economic 
plans launched in the 1970s, and now present new challenges for 
the Korean economy.
(Received 19 October 2007; Revised 24 December 2007)
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TABLE 1
MAJOR INDICATORS OF KOREAN ECONOMIC GROWTH, 



















































1960 1.2 7 　n.a. 　n.a. n.a. 10 3.4 12.8  n.a. 0.10 
1961 5.9 3.5 　n.a. 　n.a. n.a. 12 5.4 15 -2.1 n.a. 0.14 
1962 2.1 28.7 　n.a. 5.7 n.a. 11.8 5.1 16.8 -21.9 n.a. 0.14 
1963 9.1 27.3 26.5 -4.6 31.1 17.0 4.8 15.9 5.1 n.a. 0.11 
1964 9.7 -9.3 19.5 -14.9 34.4 13.2 5.9 13.6 30.6 68.0 0.09 
1965 5.7 27.1 44.5 8.1 36.4 14.1 8.6 16.0 3.9 33.9 0.12 
1966 12.2 59.5 45.6 19.2 26.4 20.4 10.4 20.3 -33.8 n.a. 0.14 
1967 5.9 22.6 47.0 22.2 24.8 20.9 11.5 22.2 -8.1 n.a. 0.18 
1968 11.3 37.4 43.8 17.7 26.1 24.9 12.8 25.6 -19.6 52.5 0.24 
1969 13.8 24.8 42.2 16.6 25.6 27.9 13.5 25.4 7.0 84.1 0.29 
1970 8.8 1 38.2 12.6 25.6 24.8 13.6 23.8 14.3 4.0 0.28 
1971 8.2 4.6 34.5 12.3 22.2 25.2 15.0 25.6 -3.9 28.7 0.37 
1972 4.5 1.7 22.1 1.7 20.4 21.4 19.4 24.2 54.7 5.7 0.40 
1973 12 26.2 30.2 5.3 24.9 25.4 28.7 31.8 35.4 1.6 0.44 
1974 7.2 14.1 -3.2 -19.3 16.1 31.8 26.7 37.9 -261.3 30.7 0.39 
1975 5.9 8.9 11.6 -9.2 20.8 28.8 26.9 35.4 24.1 31.6 0.38 
1976 10.6 20.7 25.3 3 22.3 26.6 30.0 32.0 76.5 16.1 0.37 
1977 10 30.2 26.7 6.6 20.1 28.6 30.4 31.2 60.0 31.7 0.41 
1978 9.3 34.4 26.9 4.5 22.4 32.7 28.4 32.2 -375.0 135.7 0.41 
1979 6.8 10 20.3 0.2 20.1 36.0 26.6 33.6 -84.2 6.4 0.42 
1980 -1.5 -10.7 12.7 -7.1 19.8 31.9 32.1 40.0 -12.9 13.4 0.46 
1981 6.2 -3.1 11.5 -4.3 15.7 29.9 34.3 39.7 31.6 3.6 0.48 
1982 7.3 11.1 21.8 0.7 21.1 28.9 33.2 35.8 51.9 8.7 0.56 
1983 10.8 17.4 21.6 4.4 17.2 29.2 33.0 34.1 57.7 57.7 0.58 
1984 8.1 10.9 22.2 7.6 14.6 30.6 33.4 33.6 81.8 23.3 0.61 
1985 6.8 5.3 21.1 7.4 13.7 30.4 32.0 31.4 400.0 8.1 0.66 
1986 10.6 11.5 20.9 7.0 13.9 29.4 35.6 30.6 733.3 3.7 0.73 
1987 11.1 18.1 21.3 6.7 14.6 30.3 38.3 31.2 42.0 6.3 0.81 
1988 10.6 13.6 14.4 2.7 11.7 31.2 36.4 29.3 0 28.1 0.88 
 
(Table Continued)




















































1989 6.7 16 15.9 4.1 11.7 33.8 30.8 28.7 -70.4 33.5 0.99 
1990 9.2 25.4 13.8 1.3 12.4 37.4 28.0 29.0 -147.6 31.2 1.06 
1991 9.4 14.4 13.7 0.6 13.1 39.7 26.3 29.0 -170.0 11.2 1.08 
1992 5.9 0.6 15.8 3.5 12.3 37.2 26.6 27.7 59.3 -2.8 1.16 
1993 6.1 7.7 17.1 3.5 13.5 35.7 26.5 26.1 136.3 -8.7 1.22 
1994 8.5 12.5 15.2 2.9 12.2 36.9 26.6 27.4 -300.0 -1.4 1.30 
1995 9.2 13.1 17.2 4.2 13.0 37.8 28.8 29.9 -37.5 0.2 1.32 
1996 7 8.4 6.6 3.8 2.7 39.0 27.9 31.3 -209.1 0.9 1.37 
1997 4.7 -2.3 8.6 5.9 2.7 36.1 32.4 33.0 82.4 0.3 1.43 
1998 -6.9 -22.9 7.0 5.4 1.6 25.2 46.2 33.3 2250.0 -16.3 1.63 
1999 9.5 8.3 8.0 6.2 1.8 29.3 39.1 32.4 -48.1 2.7 1.61 
2000 8.5 12.2 6.9 4.7 2.2 31.1 40.8 37.7 -53.7 0.1 1.58 
2001 3.8 -0.2 2.8 1.3 1.5 29.4 37.8 35.5 -25.8 1.9 1.64 
2002 7 6.6 3.8 2.0 1.8 29.1 35.3 33.9 -39.1 15.8 1.69 
2003 3.1 4 1.8 0.6 1.2 30.1 37.9 35.6 64.3 5.3 1.67 
2004 4.6 1.9 1.1 0.1 0.9 30.3 44.1 39.7 91.3 4.1 1.65 
Sources and notes: 
   1) Growth Rate of Real GDP, Rate of Change in Gross Investments: 
Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics System.
   2) Fixed capital stock comprises transport and machinery equipment, 
residential and nonresidential construction, and intangible assets.
   3) Curb-Market Interest Rates: 
       1960-1978: Cole and Park (1983, pp. 272-3, Table 49).
       1979-1995: Song (1997, p. 164, Table 9.4).
       1996-2004: Annual yield of 3-year corporate bonds on O.T.C, Bank 
of Korea, Economic Statistics System.
   4) Interest Rates on Time Deposits:
     1960-1978: Cole and Park (1983, pp. 272-3, Table 49).
     1979-1995: Annual interest rates on time deposits at NCB, Bank of 
Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, various volumes.
     1996-2004: Annual weighted-mean interest rates on time deposits, 
Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics System. 
   5) The Ratio of Investments to GDP, The Ratio of Exports to GDP, and 
The Ratio of Imports to GDP:
       Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics System.
   6) Trade Balance: 
     1960-1969: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, various 
issues.
     1970-2004: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics System.
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   7) Capital/Output ratio: Computed from Pyo’s capital stock data (2002) 
for 1960-1999.
   8) Capital/Output ratio is measured in current wons where output 
represents current GDP.
   9) Rate of Change in Seoul Land Value Index:
       1964-1974: Cole and Park (1983, pp. 272-3, Table 49).
       1975-2004: Ministry of Construction and Transportation, 
                    Construction Statistics.
   10) Ratio of Liquid Liabilities to GDP: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics 
System.
M2/GDP is used for 1960-1970 and M3/GDP for 1971-2004.
M2 ＝ M1 ＋ Quasi-Money (Time and savings deposits and resident’s 
foreign currency deposits at monetary institutions).
M3 ＝ M2 ＋ OFI deposits ＋ Debentures issued ＋ Commercial bills 
sold ＋ CD ＋ RP ＋ Cover Bills
Appendix: IMF Program and the Korean Financial Markets 
after the Crisis
A. IMF Program
At the onset of the 1997 financial crisis, only six U.S. billion 
dollars of foreign reserves were available to meet withdrawal 
requirements of two hundred U.S. billion dollars. An emergency 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) measure was introduced to relieve 
the financial distress. The program recommended keeping the 
domestic interest rate as high as thirty percent to stabilize the 
won/dollar exchange rate, which had plummeted to nearly one 
thousand and eight hundred won per U.S. dollar in December 1997 
from eight hundred and fifty won per U.S. dollar in the pre-crisis 
period. This prescription was opposite to that suggested at the onset 
of financial distress periods in the 1970s and 1980s. The IMF 
measure was aimed at ensuring the stability of the foreign exchange 
market to restore confidence in the won.
The IMF measure caused much debate. Financial programs in the 
late 1970s and 1980s had shown that low interest rates helped 
financially troubled firms. It is argued on the part of critics that the 
IMF policy would cause sound firms, albeit highly leveraged ones, to 
go bankrupt, thus creating even more economic trouble. Indeed, 
economic growth plunged to minus six point seven percent in 1998, 
and the unemployment rate more than doubled to six point eight 
percent in the same year, as compared to a rate of two point seven 
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percent in 1997. These data supported the argument for a low 
interest rate policy.
Nonetheless, the IMF policy helped break the state-chaebol nexus 
that had existed for nearly four decades during the development of 
the South Korean economy. The IMF measure shielded economic 
reformers seeking to create boundaries between the state and 
chaebol and advance fair competition within the Korean economy.
B. Restructuring and Financial Markets after the Crisis
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the role of government 
largely changed to that of a market-based, regulatory role with 
respect to monetary and fiscal policies. Financial liberalization 
measures were further reinforced. Domestic corporations were 
allowed to issue stocks abroad, limitations on foreign ownership of 
stocks and bonds were abolished, and futures and options markets 
related to the stock index were permitted to open.
Immediately after the crisis, government policy was aimed at 
restructuring both the financial and corporate sectors to meet the 
Bank of International Settlements (BIS) debt-equity ratio imposed by 
the IMF. A debt-equity swap was the most convenient way to reduce 
debt leverage for corporations, although this method diluted the 
ownership share of the chaebol. More transparent accounting 
practices were required on the corporate level. As such, cross-share 
holdings of stocks and cross-debt loan guarantees among chaebol 
affiliates were regulated by the Fair Trade Commission (FTC).13 
C. Bank Mergers and Acquisitions
Restructuring proceeded in both financial and corporate sectors. 
Banks, in particular, faced mergers and acquisitions (Rhee et al. 
2005, p. 68). What had been nineteen banks prior to 1998 were 
reformed into five main banks. The Choheung Bank merged with the 
Shinhan Bank. The Commercial Bank and the Hanil Bank were 
integrated to form the Hanvit Bank, which later became the Woori 
Bank. Five banks were also merged to become the Kookmin Bank, 
and the Seoul Bank was integrated into the Hana Bank. Foreign 
banks actively participated in acquiring shares of domestic banks. 
13 The cross-share holdings and cross-debt guarantees created leverage for 
the chaebols.
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Lone Star acquired fifty-one percent of the shares in the Korea 
Foreign Exchange Bank. New Bridge Capital bought forty-nine 
percent of Cheil Bank shares. Approximately seventy percent of 
Kookmin Bank stocks were held by foreign owners, as were fifty 
percent of Shinhan Finance shares. At Hanmi Bank, foreign 
shareholding reached eighty-six percent. The merchant banks, which 
were blamed for reckless inflows of foreign short-term capital, shrank 
from thirty in 1997 to three in 2001. Bank mergers and acquisitions 
increased competitiveness at the international level and facilitated 
the financial sector restructuring by improving the debt/equity ratio 
to meet the BIS standard.
The financial supervisory function of the government was also 
strengthened under the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) 
launched in 1999. The FSC served a financial intermediary role in 
the market. Two years ahead, the Korea Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (KDIC) had also been established to protect depositors 
against possible bank defaults and also to arrange for the merging of 
banks. 
Government emphasis on bank restructuring left investment trust 
companies unregulated. Loans were channeled into the investment 
trust companies during the economic crisis. For instance, to avoid 
the credit crunch immediately after the crisis, Daewoo, one of the 
biggest conglomerates, issued corporate bonds through investment 
trust companies (ITCs). After the collapse of Daewoo in July 1999, 
the flow of funds reversed from the ITCs to the banking sector. In 
1998 the total assets held by ITCs reached two hundred and 
fourteen trillion won, which is more than twice that held in the 
previous year. 
D. Bond Markets
Government-issued bonds of the 1980s were normally assigned to 
the enforcement of NBFIs. After the crisis, the need to meet the BIS 
capital ratio induced banks to invest in bonds instead of extending 
loans to corporations. This situation heightened demand for bonds. 
Credit risks associated with corporate bonds, however, were seen as 
high after the Daewoo default. The government intervened to 
normalize the market. Bonds were categorized as junior and senior 
tranches, in accordance with their credit risks. Junior bonds with 
high risks were assumed by the KDB, while senior tranches were 
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more often placed with investors.14 
Bond investments were an immediate government concern in the 
post-crisis bank restructuring period. Public funds totaling approxi- 
mately on hundred and forty-seven trillion won were injected into the 
economy during the period from 1999 to 2002 through bonds issued 
by the Korea Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO) and the KDIC. 
KAMCO was in charge of purchasing non-performing loans (NPL) to 
help normalize financial institutions after the crisis. KAMCO 
securitized NPLs by issuing asset-backed securities (ABS) and issued 
approximately seventy percent of all bonds. Introducing impaired 
assets to the market through ABS issuances helped develop the 
capital market after the crisis. However, as Oh and Rhee (2002) have 
noted, despite government efforts, market autonomy was necessary 
for the creation of future bond markets in which investors would 
bear the risks, as opposed to the credit subsidization created by 
government institutions such as the KDB.
In 1998 the government announced measures to develop auto- 
nomous bond markets. To set up stable expectations in investors, 
the government made it a policy to inform the public of the maturity 
schedules and issuance amounts at the beginning of each year. In 
1999, a specialized bond market was established in affiliation with 
the Korea Exchange market. Another measure served to integrate 
diverse bonds and establish a leading indicative yield rate for 
representative bonds. The government promoted the development of 
the corporate bond market by introducing collateral bond obligations 
(CBO) and collateral loan obligations (CLO). From 1995 to 1997 the 
bond market increased by twenty trillion won to thirty trillion won, 
further jumping to one hundred and ten trillion won by 1998 and 
six hundred and seventy billion won in 2003, roughly one point two 
times the 2003 GDP (Rhee et al. 2005, pp. 196-7).
E. Stock Markets 
Despite the government’s push for public stock offerings, the stock 
market did not operate normally until the latter half of the 1980s. 
Public enterprises began privatization with the issuance of so-called 
national stocks. In 1988, Pohang Iron and Steel (POSCO) became the 
14
Interestingly, the KDB allocated loans to target industries in the 1960s 
and 1970s. Then, some three to four decades later, the role of the KDB 
changed to the placing of investments in the bond market.
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first public enterprise to initiate public offerings. Korea Electric 
followed with public offerings in 1989. Deregulation allowing foreign 
ownership in stocks and the introduction of the various forms of 
financial derivatives after the crisis contributed to a boom in the 
domestic stock market. The market value of listed companies grew 
from one hundred and fifty-one trillion won in 1994 to three 
hundred and fifty-five trillion won by the end of 2003. This doubling 
in size amounted to sixty-three percent of the GDP.15 Foreigners 
owned 40 percent of the market value of listed stocks at the end of 
2003. The Korea Securities Dealers Quotation (KOSDAQ) initiated in 
1996 was designed to facilitate equity financing in knowledge-based 
venture corporations, high-tech corporations, and small- to medium- 
sized enterprises. In addition, by the end of 2003, Korea ranked 
fifteenth in the world in the size of stock market capitalized values 
and twelfth in the world in terms of the total value of shares traded 
at the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE). 
Financial derivatives increased in both amount and variety. In 
2003 the total value of derivatives trading was one thousand seven 
hundred eighty-eight trillion won, equal to three point seven times 
the GDP, and the daily average trading volume in KOSPI 200 futures 
reached ten thousand eight hundred forty-two billion won.16 These 
derivatives are related to currency, interest, and stocks, with 
currency-related derivates accounting for ninety-nine percent of the 
total.
F. Foreign Exchange Markets
Foreign exchange in the 1960s and 1970s was centralized under 
government control, which severely limited the amount of foreign 
exchange. The foreign exchange rate was pegged to the U.S. dollar 
and, periodically, was raised sharply. After doubling following the IRP 
of 1965, the exchange rate ranged between two hundred and seventy 
won per U.S. dollar and three hundred twenty won per U.S. dollar 
from 1974-1979. The won/dollar exchange rate was fixed at four 
hundred and eighty-four won per U.S. dollar and later raised to six 
hundred and sixty won per U.S. dollar in 1980. From 1980 to 1990, 
the foreign exchange rate was managed by the basket system. The 
market average exchange rate system was applied from 1990 until 
15
Bank of Korea (2004, p. 252).
16
Bank of Korea (2004, p. 291).  
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the 1997 financial crisis. Under this system, market exchange rates 
applied between banks were weighted to yield a market average rate 
that served as the basis for foreign exchange transactions on the 
following day. Fluctuations from the base rate were allowed within a 
certain limit. A limit of point four percent was imposed on the 
variability of the exchange rate. This limit was gradually increased to 
ten percent. The exchange rates varied between seven hundred won 
per U.S. dollar and nine hundred won per U.S. dollar in the 1990s 
prior to the crisis. After the crisis, the exchange rate was allowed to 
move freely in accordance with market situations. The government 
entered into the market only to smooth exchange rates. The 
exchange market, especially as related to derivatives, expanded 
substantially after the crisis. The amount of currency-related 
derivatives traded in 2003 reached one thousand seven hundred 
sixty-seven trillion won, equal to about three times the GDP.
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